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ABSTRACT Service provision by local governments can be delivered using in-house
bureaucracies, private ﬁrms, and partnerships with other governments or the not-for-
proﬁt sector. This production decision has been a major focus of discussion among
scholars, practitioners and political agents for the last quarter of a century. The
transaction costs framework is an important tool to analyse decisions regarding the
production of local services. In this paper, the authors employ this framework to analyse
service delivery in Portugal and ﬁnd that service characteristics and the local political
environment play a key role in local oﬃcials’ choice among the three governance
mechanisms to deliver public services.
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Due to their level of proximity and periodic transfers of competences from the
national government, local governments in Portugal gained importance over
the past two decades as service providers. Their functional responsibilities have
been extended signiﬁcantly over several areas including water supply,
promotion of regional development, solid waste collection, emergency
management, health care, education, and land use management, among many
others. To cope with all these challenges, local governments changed from a
general, multi-purpose organisation to a complex network of relationships
with other public bodies, private agents, and not-for-proﬁt organisations.
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The choice of local oﬃcials regarding service delivery options has been an
issue of debate over the past quarter century both in the academic and
practitioner literatures. Prior research highlights the role of service type, the
level of political and administrative turnover, and the socioeconomic and
demographic status of the jurisdiction as relevant factors inﬂuencing the
decision (Stein 1993; Clingermayer, Feiock & Stream 2003; Feiock,
Clingermayer, & Dasse 2003; Joassart-Marcelli & Musso 2005; Brown,
Potoski, & Van Slyke 2006; Carr, LeRoux & Shrestha 2009; Feiock and
Jang 2009; Shrestha & Feiock 2010). The signiﬁcant amount of research in
the US context contrasts sharply with the limited scope of analysis in
Europe, where most research focuses in dyadic choices – e.g. public versus
private or public versus not-for-proﬁt options – rather than analysing the
three sectors simultaneously. One notable exception to this rule examines
the use of mixed public–private ﬁrms as a partial privatisation strategy for
water distribution and solid waste collection services (Bel & Fageda 2010).
This work begins to ﬁll this important lacuna by testing a transaction
costs model of service delivery with data from municipal governments in a
European setting. Speciﬁcally, we collected data on service provision and
production choices in Portugal and employ these data to test a transaction
costs model of service delivery options by a sample of Portuguese local
governments. The transaction costs framework suggests that there are costs
in adopting external solutions resulting from bounded rationality and
opportunistic behaviour by the agents. As transaction costs increase, the
production cost eﬃciency gains from externalisation become less decisive.
Service complexity, asset speciﬁcity, and the local political environment
inﬂuence the level of transaction costs and hence the decision to externalise
the service.
The transaction costs hypotheses are tested using a multinomial logit
regression model. This test is an extension of other eﬀorts reported in the
literature and the goal is to cast contracting choices as delegation decisions
involving economic and political transaction costs. The survey of
Portuguese local governments allowed us to identify a total of twelve
government arrangement alternatives to deliver public services. These twelve
alternatives are organised in three ‘classic’ governance mechanisms –
hierarchy, market, and partnerships/networks – according to a set of
predeﬁned criteria. We measure the economic and political transaction costs
involved in service delivery while controlling for other contextual factors
aﬀecting the decision choice.
The ﬁrst section summarises the literature of the application of the
transaction costs framework to the choice of service delivery mechanisms.
Next, we develop the theory and present a series of hypotheses linking
transaction costs with service production choices. The third section
describes the context of our study highlighting both the historical
constraints associated with production choices in Portugal and the relevance
of this study for gaining additional understanding of local governments in
616 M. Rodrigues et al.
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Southern European countries. Data and methods are presented in section
four and the ﬁndings reported in section ﬁve. The piece closes with a brief set
of conclusions and implications for future research.
1. Literature background
The transaction costs framework (TCF) is frequently used by scholars as an
important tool to explain the choice between diﬀerent alternatives to deliver
public services (Brown & Potoski 2003; Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock 2008;
Tavares & Camo˜es 2007, 2010). Robert Stein (1993) employs service
typologies developed by Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) and Peterson (1981) to
support the argument that government service delivery arrangements are a
function of the nature and scope of the service to be provided. Ferris and
Graddy (1986; 1991) point out the nature of the service as the main factor in
decision making and highlight the challenges that local governments face
when contracting out with private vendors. Building on the work of Ronald
Coase (1937) and Oliver Williamson (1981; 1985; 1996) on transactions
costs, Brown and Potoski (2003; 2005) argue that local government choices
are driven by the degree of asset speciﬁcity and service measurability
involved in the decision to provide local services.
The key argument of the TCF states that the comparative analysis of
ﬁnancial costs of the capital invested, personnel, and property costs
(production costs) is insuﬃcient to justify the choice of one of the
alternative mechanisms to deliver public services. The costs associated with
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing contracts with external vendors must
also be considered, as transaction costs, in the analysis of alternative forms
of production (Brown & Potoski 2003). The decision to produce a service
through an in-house bureaucracy, externalise it to a private vendor or resort
to other government or not-for-proﬁt organisation is inﬂuenced by the
transaction costs of service delivery associated with service characteristics
and political context. Thus, the most appropriate governance mechanism is
the one that minimises the transaction costs of service delivery (Brown &
Potoski 2003, Nelson 1997; Ferris & Graddy 1997; Feiock, Clingermayer,
Shrestha, & Dasse 2007).
Transaction costs result from bounded rationality and agent opportunism
involved in contractual agreements and vary according to service
characteristics, including the speciﬁcity of assets, service measurability,
and the frequency of transactions (Coase 1937; Williamson 1985). Better
productive eﬃciency can be achieved through private production because
production costs tend to be lower in the private sector. However, external
delivery choices involve transaction costs stemming from the need to
mitigate agent opportunism in contractual agreements. When total costs are
considered, in-house options may actually become more eﬃcient alter-
natives (Nelson 1997). Empirical work by Bel and Fageda (2010) compares
the use of mixed ﬁrms with pure public and pure private production options
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and ﬁnds that private production is less likely for services displaying high
transaction costs.
The consideration of total costs involves not only the economic
transaction costs related with service characteristics but also the ‘political’
transaction costs linked with the political environment of service delivery.
While economic transaction costs are directly related to the characteristics
of the goods or services being contracted, political transaction costs are
external to the transaction but may constrain the choice of the production
mechanism to be employed. The model presented here accounts for both
types of transaction costs associated with service delivery choices.
2. Service characteristics, political environment and production choices
When deciding to provide speciﬁc services, local government oﬃcials are
faced with alternative mechanisms to produce these services. The choice
involves three major components: the characteristics of the service, a set of
external constraints, and the production alternatives available. This section
is concerned with the ﬁrst two aspects of the production decision. The next
section tackles the last.
2.1 Economic transaction costs
Economic transaction costs are associated with the uncertainty involved in
contracting with external agents (other governments, nonproﬁt organisa-
tions or private ﬁrms) for service production. Contractual agreements entail
both ex-ante and ex-post problems derived from bounded rationality and
opportunism. Adverse selection is associated with hiring an agent that will
not fulﬁll the contractual terms, something that the hiring government
cannot perfectly detect in advance due to bounded rationality. In order to
overcome adverse selection, local oﬃcials face costs involved in the process
of searching, selecting and hiring the agent in a context of imperfect
information.
Moral hazard occurs ex-post and can be regarded as the cost of
monitoring the agent’s eﬀort and/or performance. In the absence of perfect
information, the agent can behave opportunistically by failing to uphold the
terms of the contract. Monitoring activities entail costs that increase with
service complexity, e.g., opportunistic behavior is easier to monitor in the
case of a solid waste collection company than in mental health care services.
Adverse selection and moral hazard are closely associated with two
service characteristics: asset speciﬁcity and service complexity. In general, it
can be argued that economic transaction costs increase either when
contracting for highly speciﬁc assets or when monitoring highly complex
services.
Asset speciﬁcity increases transaction costs because speciﬁc and specia-
lised investments and skills are diﬃcult to redeploy in alternative uses in
618 M. Rodrigues et al.
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public service production. After the ﬁrst round of procurement, contract
agreements for asset speciﬁc goods and services lock buyer and seller in a
bilateral monopoly. The contracting government is a single service
purchaser who attributes the ﬁrst contract to the best bidder who in turn
becomes vulnerable to the monopsony. Since the investments are highly
speciﬁc the winner develops a competitive advantage over other vendors in
future contracts. As competition for future procurement decisions is
reduced, the local government becomes exposed to opportunism on the
part of the initial winner (Williamson 1985; Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke
2006).
The externalisation of asset speciﬁc goods and services can result in a
fundamental transformation, whereby the initial large numbers bidding is
converted into an ex-post bilateral supply (Williamson 1985: 61). As a result,
services involving highly speciﬁc assets tend to be provided by hierarchical
mechanisms, while services with low asset speciﬁcity are provided using
market solutions (Coase 1937; Williamson 1981, 1985; Ferris & Graddy
1997; Nelson 1997).
Recent empirical ﬁndings point to a more complex relationship between
asset speciﬁcity and externalisation. Brown and Potoski (2003) suggest and
ﬁnd support for the idea that local governments turn to external service
providers because highly speciﬁc assets have also capital-intensive cost
structures. Shrestha and Feiock (2010) argue that the relationship between
asset speciﬁcity and externalisation follows an inverted U-shape. Inter-
governmental contracting is more likely at mid-range levels of asset
speciﬁcity, while in-house production predominates at very high levels and
private contracting is more frequent at lower levels. Carr, LeRoux, and
Shrestha (2009) ﬁnd support for this nonlinear relationship, particularly that
at very high levels of asset speciﬁcity local governments avoid nongovern-
mental producers. Based on the theoretical arguments by Williamson (1985)
and the ﬁndings by Carr, LeRoux, and Shrestha (2009), we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 1: Services involving highly speciﬁc assets are less likely to
be provided by market mechanisms.
Hypothesis 2: When externalisation is an alternative to hierarchic
mechanisms, local oﬃcials are more likely to partner with other
governments or nonproﬁt organisations to produce highly speciﬁc
assets.
Service measurability refers to the degree of diﬃculty to evaluate service
outcomes and monitor the performance of the agent. According to the
assumptions of transaction costs theory, service measurability is a problem
due to information asymmetry because the presence of both bounded
rationality and opportunism leads to moral hazard contractual problems
(Williamson 1985). Service activities that are easy to measure are more
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suitable to be described in a formal contract and therefore more amenable to
external production. In contrast, complex and/or intangible activities are
less amenable to monitoring by the contractor, so transaction costs increase
signiﬁcantly for contracting out these activities.
Past ﬁndings in the empirical literature indicate a signiﬁcant degree of
support for this service complexity hypothesis (Brown & Potoski 2003;
Levin & Tadelis 2007). However, recent empirical work points out that there
are situations of externalisation to nonproﬁt organisations, even in the case
of complex services (Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock 2008; Feiock and Jang
2009). Presumably this occurs due to the fundamental diﬀerences in terms of
values and goal congruence between the private and the public and not-for-
proﬁt sectors. Proﬁt maximisation constitutes a high-powered incentive for
private ﬁrms that can lead to a decline in service quality to reduce costs
(Frant 1996). The eﬃciency gains associated with contracting out with
private ﬁrms, particularly in the case of labour intensive services, are
counterweighted by potential opportunistic behavior on the part of proﬁt-
seeking ﬁrms (Ferris & Graddy 1986; Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock 2008;
Feiock and Jang 2009). The incentives to opportunism are less prevalent in
the public and not-for-proﬁt sectors, where slack resources are reinvested in
organisational activities or reverted back to organisational budgets. Hence,
when externalisation is considered for eﬃciency reasons, the use of network
mechanisms is more likely, namely the establishment of partnerships with
other public agencies or third sector actors.
Hypothesis 3: Services that are complex and/or diﬃcult to measure are
less likely to be provided through market mechanisms.
Hypothesis 4: When externalisation is an option, local oﬃcials prefer
partnerships with other governments or nonproﬁt organisations to
produce complex and/or intangible services.
2.2 Political transaction costs
Political transaction costs result from the context where the service is
provided and lead to limitations of sector choice by local oﬃcials. In other
words, in the presence of political transaction costs local oﬃcials see the
number of service production alternatives reduced due to factors which are
not directly related with the contractual decision, but stem from the context
where this decision takes place. Political transaction costs are not ‘political’
in the partisanship sense, but linked with the credibility of the local
government in a contractual exchange (North 1990; Dixit 1996).
An adverse political environment reduces the attractiveness of service
contracts because it creates uncertainty for potential private and not-for-
proﬁt organisations due to the possibility of government reneging on
contractual agreements. Political and/or administrative instability in the
620 M. Rodrigues et al.
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local executive can adversely impact the level of transaction costs and reduce
the alternatives regarding service delivery. Recent work by Feiock and Jang
(2009) conﬁrms this argument by ﬁnding a negative relationship between
mayoral turnover and nonproﬁt contracting for services for the elderly.
Having the same executive for several consecutive terms may be translated
into greater conﬁdence and expectation of credible commitment to establish
contracts. According to Feiock, Clingermayer, and Dasse (2003), this
stability facilitates the use of external agents in the provision of public
services. However, the same authors alert us to a possible exception to this
eﬀect. A higher level of political instability may also be an incentive to the
externalisation of public services in order to shift blame to the providers
(Frant 1996; Clingermayer & Feiock 1997; Hood 1998). In this case, the use
of nonproﬁt organisations or partnerships with other governments may be a
more viable alternative than private ﬁrms. Local oﬃcials are able to duck
blame while at the same time overcoming the absence of private vendors
willing to enter contractual agreements due to political and/or administrative
instability. In light of these ﬁndings, we posit that:
Hypothesis 5: Political instability decreases the probability of adoption
of market alternatives and increases the likelihood of using partner-
ships rather than hierarchical solutions.
Hypothesis 6: Administrative instability decreases the probability of
adoption of market alternatives and increases the likelihood of using
partnerships rather than hierarchical solutions.
The relationship between ﬁnancial status and the decision to outsource the
provision of public services has been a matter of strong contention in the
empirical literature. The dominant view in the public administration
literature is that adverse ﬁnancial situations lead to the adoption of external
arrangements rather than in-house hierarchical solutions. With reduced
ﬁnancial capacity the need to provide public services at reduced costs leads
local governments to use markets and/or partnerships, as external
procurement is expected to be more innovative and cost eﬀective (Ferris
1986; Brown, Potoski, & Slyke 2006).
However, empirical ﬁndings in the ﬁeld of economics suggest that
contracting out at the local level may actually be more prevalent during
economic upturns (Borcherding 1988; Wittman 1989; see also Pallesen
2004). This argument underlines that the externalisation of services to
achieve technical eﬃciency and cost savings during economic austerity
ignores the transaction costs associated with externalisation decisions. When
transaction costs are accounted for ‘‘it may very well make it rational for the
city to produce the service in-house’’ (Nelson 1997, p. 84).
This argument is also in line with the idea that ﬁnancial crises reduce the
leverage of local governments over their options. Externalisation involves
Transaction Costs in Service Delivery 621
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unacceptable political and electoral risks due to the loss of political control
in fundamental service delivery areas. Consistently, it can be argued that
contracting out is primarily a political decision and, as a result, it can only
be undertaken when public revenues and expenditures are easier to increase
in order to reduce public employee resistance. Where local public sector
unions are stronger, such as in highly decentralised countries, opposition to
contracting out may be especially vigorous during economic decline
(Pallesen 2004).
Hypothesis 7: Jurisdictions facing ﬁscal stress are less likely to
externalise their services.
2.3 Control variables
Community characteristics can also aﬀect the decision of the production
alternative to be employed. Communities facing signiﬁcant economic and
demographic changes are more likely to resort to externalisation, either
through contracting out with private vendors or by establishing partnerships
with the not-for-proﬁt sector. Heterogeneous communities display increased
preference diversity and citizen demands over local government service
provision (Clingermayer, Feiock, & Stream 2003; Feiock and Jang 2009).
Preference diversity in a local jurisdiction varies positively with the increase
in personal income per capita, population growth, density, and urbanisa-
tion. Organisation theory suggests that jurisdictions facing such pressures
are more likely to diversify their service delivery options, since hierarchical
mechanisms seem more appropriate for stable environments (Weber 1947;
Alexander 1995; Beetham 1991; Blau & Meyer 1971). In dynamic
environments, with greater levels of functional complexity, more ﬂexible
solutions are expected (Burns and Stalker 1961).
3. Local service delivery in the Portuguese context
The decision to provide speciﬁc services involves the consideration of all
possible alternatives to produce each service provided by local governments.
The last section employed a transaction costs framework to address two
important features of this choice: the characteristics of the service to be
produced and the external constraints that can inﬂuence the outsourcing
decision. This section is concerned with the production alternatives available
to local government oﬃcials. The discussion is framed by the history and the
evolution of functional responsibilities of local governments in Portugal.
Local governments deliver public services using a complex set of
organisational choices. Hierarchy is the coordination mechanism most
commonly used by Portuguese local governments (Rodrigues 2009) and it is
considered the most natural and eﬃcient way to manage bureaucratic
622 M. Rodrigues et al.
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organisations in a stable environment (Weber 1947; Alexander 1995;
Beetham 1991; Verhoest, Peters, Beuselinck, Meyers, & Bouckaert 2004).
Local governments in Portugal have a longstanding tradition and most
municipalities (concelhos) have existed with signiﬁcant autonomy since the
Middle Ages. They had autonomy to manage the municipality in what
concerns their land, commerce transportation regulations and markets, road
construction and maintenance, local income and price taxes, and police
power, among others (Manique 1989). In the nineteenth century, municipal
autonomy was suspended. The liberal regime attempted to rationalise
the administrative system and to control municipalities by embracing the
French Napoleonic structure of administration. The debate about the
territorial division and organisation was inspired by the French adminis-
tration. Over time, centralisation and state power turned the country into a
highly centralised administrative state (Livermore 1976).
The advent of the republican regime in the early years of the twentieth
century and particularly the authoritarian administration of the Estado
Novo (1926–1974) reinforced the centralised pattern of Portuguese institu-
tions. The regime developed a corporative and autocratic emphasis,
strengthened the importance of the administrative bureaucracy, and
introduced institutional uniformity. During the dictatorship period,
municipalities had limited competencies and operated as an extension of
the national government. For a period of almost 50 years, municipalities
essentially played a role as administrative units of the state (Opello 1983),
acting as administrative agencies organising activities in-house according to
a single structure model of local service delivery.
Services responsible for the preparation and implementation of admin-
istrative decisions were organised as hierarchical structures, the Municipal
Services (Servic¸os Municipais) (Oliveira 1996). For services of an economic
and industrial nature, such as water distribution, electricity, sewage, garbage
collection, and public transportation, local governments were allowed to
create Municipalised Services (Servic¸os Municipalizados), under certain
conditions established by law (Pereira & Almeida 1985, p. 214). Approved
by the Municipal Assembly (deliberative body), these services had some
ﬁnancial autonomy and an Executive Board, but stopped short of having
corporate-like status, since the municipality was the sole owner and they
remained hierarchically integrated in the municipality (Caetano 1982).
The democratic regime introduced in 1974 and the Portuguese Constitu-
tion of 1976 re-established democratic local power, new service delivery roles,
and ﬁnancial and administrative autonomy. As new competences were as-
cribed to local governments, citizens became more aware of their role and the
central government started a new era of intergovernmental relations based
on three basic principles: local autonomy, decentralisation, and subsidiarity.
The new functional competencies and the political, social, and economic
development pressured the emergence of new forms of local service delivery.
However, New Public Management ideas and organisational forms are
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latecomers in the Portuguese local government scene. The continental
Europe juridical tradition of administrative reform emphasised changes in
legislation, not managerial changes (Rodrigues and Arau´jo 2006). The
country’s history and political culture also contribute to explain this
resistance to market alternatives and the predominance of state-oriented
production choices (Tavares & Camo˜es 2007, p. 537).
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some changes in public service
delivery based on market type mechanisms and the use of private
management tools. By the mid 1980s, local governments began using
contracting-out or franchising as alternatives to in-house solutions. The
relationship between local governments and private agents was based on
contractual agreements between the parties in a competitive environment.
Since the late 1990s, local governments were authorised to create Municipal
and Inter-municipal Corporations. These have corporate-like status and
administrative, ﬁnancial and patrimonial autonomy, and are regulated by the
law of public corporations and by the commercial society’s code. In theory, this
solution resembles the use of externalisation, since it shifts public service
production to a diﬀerent agent than the local government. However, municipal
power remains untouched since local governments decide the creation,
modiﬁcation and termination of the corporations and control appointments
to their managerial boards. In practice, both ﬁnancial and personnel
management are often integrated as local governments are forced to
consolidate accounts and employees can be transferred from the in-house
bureaucracy to the corporation payroll and vice-versa.
More recently, local government extended the use of partnership
mechanisms to provide services to their citizens. Partnerships with nonproﬁt
organisations and other governments are now regarded as viable options to
provide municipal services, particularly in the ﬁeld of social policy (elderly
care services, child care, social housing, and health care). While contracting
out requires special care with contractual writing, monitoring and
evaluation activities, partnerships with not-for-proﬁt organisations provide
some of the market advantages, but are based on reciprocity, shared goals
and values, and information facilitation through voluntary participation of
all actors (Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha, & Dasse 2007).
Local governments have also created commercial companies. In some
cases, these new entities were created with other municipalities (Municipal
Commercial Societies), with the central government (Public Commercial
Societies), and with private agents (Mixed Commercial Societies). In the ﬁrst
two types, the split of decision powers indicates these classify as partner-
ships, while in the last case the municipality is a minority shareholder in a
private ﬁrm.
In sum, local government oﬃcials are able to choose from a total of
twelve alternatives available to produce services. Not all twelve alternatives
are actually available to all services provided by local governments in
Portugal, as many do not have the market opportunities or potential
624 M. Rodrigues et al.
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nonproﬁt partners to contract with (Rodrigues 2009). The complete list is
depicted in table 1.
These organisations of service delivery can be classiﬁed according to
broad governance arrangements (hierarchy/market/network). Table 1 uses a
set of organisational features to classify each service delivery arrangement
within a governance mechanism. We use the direct control criteria for
hierarchic type mechanisms (HTM), competition criteria for market type
mechanisms (MTM), and inter-organisational cooperation criteria for
network type mechanisms (NTM).
4. Data and methods
In presenting our hypotheses, we discussed several determinants of the
choice between alternative governance mechanisms. The variables included
in the analysis concern service features, political environment, and
community characteristics measured by the indicators described in Table 2.
During the year 2008, we conducted an electronic survey of local
government oﬃcials in 278 municipalities in Continental Portugal. We
received 101 valid responses, corresponding to a 36.3% response rate. Our
dependent variable is the governance mechanism chosen by the 101
municipalities to provide 42 diﬀerent services. The total number of
observations included in the analysis is signiﬁcantly reduced because not
all services are provided by the respondents.
Following procedures by Brown and Potoski (2003; 2004, 2005), Levin
and Tadelis (2007), Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha, and Dasse (2007), and
LeRoux (2007), we assess the level of asset speciﬁcity and service
measurability by asking oﬃcials to rate each municipal service on two
scales from 1 (low) to 5 (high) asset speciﬁcity and from 1 (low) to 5 (high)
service complexity. Since both service characteristics are related to the
provisions deﬁned in the contractual agreement, the perception of local
oﬃcials is most likely the best approximation to measuring these features.
The survey provided assistance to the respondents by clarifying the concepts
of asset speciﬁcity and service complexity. Asset speciﬁcity was deﬁned as
(Brown & Potoski 2005, p, 329):
‘‘the use of a speciﬁc location that is only movable at a great cost; the
use of highly specialised human skills that cannot be put to work for
other purposes; the use of specialised tools or a complex system
designed for a single purpose; the requirement that the service reach
the user within a relatively limited period of time or the quality of the
service greatly diminishes.’’
When dealing with service complexity, again we clarify the concept (Brown
& Potoski 2005, p. 335): ‘‘government oﬃcials can easily write a contract
and clearly specify the activities and outcomes for the vendor to perform
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and achieve; government oﬃcials can monitor the quality and quantity of
these activities and their outcomes’’.
Political and administrative stability are measured following a similar
procedure as suggested by Feiock, Clingermayer, and Dasse (2003). For
each indicator (administrative and political) we asked the respondents to
rate on a scale from 1 (less stability) to 5 (more stability) the classiﬁcation
that best suited their jurisdiction. The indicators to gauge the ﬁnancial status
of the municipality are extracted from the Financial Yearbook of
Portuguese Local Governments edited by Carvalho, Fernandes, Jorge,
and Camo˜es (2006) and published by the Center for Research in Public
Policy and Administration. Financial dependency is the proportion of
central government grants in total local revenues. Net debt is calculated as
the total local budgetary balance. The ﬁrst variable gauges the long-term
ﬁnancial status of the local community, whereas the second variable is
primarily a short-term measure of budgetary stress.
In order to control for community characteristics, we employ a diverse set
of indicators that taps into diﬀerent aspects of local dynamics. Socio-
economic status is gauged by personal income per capita and by a social
development index (SDI) calculated as the average of three indexes: life
expectancy, educational level, and basic local infrastructure coverage. The
SDI varies from 0 to 1. Demographic trends are accounted for by the rate of
Table 2. Variable description and sources
Variable Description Source
Governance mechanism Dependent Variable; Measures the choice
between alternatives. Takes the values
of 1¼Hierarchy; 2¼Market;
3¼Network.
Direct Survey to
Municipalities
(2008)
Asset speciﬁcity Likert scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5
(high)
Survey (2008)
Service complexity Likert scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5
(high)
Survey (2008)
Politicals Likert scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5
(high)
Survey (2008)
Administrative stability Likert scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5
(high)
Survey (2008)
Financial dependency Financial dependency is the proportion of
central government grants in total local
revenues
Financial Yearbook
(2006)
Net debt Total local budgetary balance (a negative
number is a deﬁcit)
Financial Yearbook
(2006)
ISD Index of social development as measured
by Portuguese government
INE (2006)
Income Personal income per capita INE (2006)
Population growth Rate of population growth (2001–2006) INE (2006)
Area Area in square kilometers INE (2006)
Population density Population per square kilometer INE (2006)
Urban Land Proportion of urban land in total area INE (2006)
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population growth, area, and population density. These indicators also
control for possible scale economies associated with local service produc-
tion. We control for the economic proﬁle of the community by including the
proportion of urban land use. Data were retrieved from the National
Bureau of Statistics (INE 2006). All variables and indicators are summarised
in Table 2 and descriptive statistics are included in Table 3.
The dependent variable assumes one of three possible nominal outcomes:
hierarchy (coded 1), market (coded 2), and networks/partnerships (coded 3).
Table 4 presents a complete description of our dependent variable, including
the number of municipal governments providing each of the 42 services in
our data set, as well as the production decisions associated with each of the
services. Most services are produced through in-house bureaucracies. There
are a few exceptions to this rule, namely electrical power, health care
services, public transportation, and solid waste treatment. Out of 4,242
possible provision decisions, the 101 local governments included in our
sample provide 2,843 services, the vast majority produced by in-house
bureaucracies or other hierarchical variations (77.7%). Markets are used in
319 cases (11.22%) and networks/partnerships in 315 (11.08%).
The literature indicates that the multinomial logit model is the most
appropriate for estimating unordered, multi-category dependent variables,
as this is an extension of the binary logit regression model when the
dependent variable is no longer dichotomous but a nominal one (Borooah
2002, Aldrich & Nelson 1984; Liao 1994). The model assumes a reference
category (in our case, hierarchy), and provides the odds, in probabilistic
terms, of the other categories (market and networks) (Borooah 2002,
Aldrich & Nelson 1984; Liao 1994). This econometric model uses maximum
likelihood for estimating regression coeﬃcients. This method is used in logit
models because the errors do not follow a normal distribution and do not
have constant variance. Robust standard errors are calculated with the
Huber/White/Sandwich (HWS) variance estimator.
Table 3. Independent variables descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation Maximum Minimum
Asset speciﬁcity 3.40 .98 5 0
Service complexity 2.65 1.12 5 0
Political stability 4.54 .64 5 3
Administrative stability 4.48 .59 5 3
Financial dependency .37 .21 .87 .07
Net debt 2.60e+07 7.74e+07 7.35e+08 71.43e+07
Social Development Index .90 .024 .94 .831
Income per capita 731.57 161.4 1523.05 546.13
Population growth rate .34 6.82 24.47 710.44
Area 302.12 251.25 1232.94 7.94
Population density 377.27 853.78 6015.50 10.49
Proportion of urban land .12 .14 .635 .004
628 M. Rodrigues et al.
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Table 4. Provision and production choices for 42 services
Services
Provision Production Decision
Service
Provided Hierarchy Market Network
Airports 12 (11.88%) 9 (75.00%) 2 (16.67%) 1 (8.33%)
Ambulance /EMS 56 (55.45%) 30 (53.57%) 1 (1.79%) 25 (44.64%)
Animal control 59 (58.42%) 42 (71.19%) 1 (1.69%) 16 (27.12%)
Beautiﬁcation 92 (91.09%) 78 (84.78%) 12 (13.04%) 2 (2.17%)
Building maintenance 71 (70.30%) 60 (84.51%) 11 (15.49%) 0 (0.00%)
Building security 67 (66.34%) 44 (65.67%) 23 (34.33%) 0 (0.00%)
Canteen service
provision
40 (39.60%) 29 (72.50%) 8 (20.00%) 3 (7.50%)
Cemetery services 89 (88.2%) 87 (97.75%) 2 (2.25%) 0 (0.00%)
Childcare services 74 (73.27%) 69 (93.24%) 1 (1.35%) 4 (5.41%)
City planning 98 (97.03%) 95 (96.94%) 2 (2.04%) 1 (1.02%)
Code enforcement 87 (86.14%) 84 (96.55%) 2 (2.30%) 1 (1.15%)
Convention centres
and auditoriums
78 (77.23%) 72 (92.31%) 1 (1.28%) 5 (6.41%)
Economic/industrial
facilities
34 (33.66%) 28 (82.35%) 1 (2.94%) 5 (14.71%)
Electricity 46 (45.54%) 3 (6.52%) 32 (69.57%) 11 (23.91%)
Foreign relations 56 (55.45%) 52 (92.86%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (7.14%)
Health care services 35 (34.65%) 8 (22.86%) 13 (37.14%) 14 (40.00%)
Housing 69 (68.32%) 65 (94.20%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (5.80%)
Industrial facilities 44 (43.56%) 39 (88.64%) 4 (9.09%) 1 (2.27%)
Library 87 (86.14%) 87 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%)
Museums 57 (56.44%) 56 (98.25%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (1.75%)
Parking services 42 (41.58%) 30 (71.43%) 12 (28.57%) 0 (0.00%)
Parking structures
and facilities
57 (56.44%) 47 (82.46%) 10 (17.54%) 0 (0.00%)
Police 17 (16.83%) 16 (94.12%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (5.88%)
Poverty prevention
programs
79 (78.22%) 57 (72.15%) 0 (0.00%) 22 (27.85%)
Public bus system 47 (46.53%) 19 (40.43%) 27 (57.45%) 1 (2.13%)
Recreation facilities 89 (88.12%) 83 (93.26%) 2 (2.25%) 4 (4.49%)
Road maintenance 85 (84.16%) 56 (65.88%) 29 (34.12%) 0 (0.00%)
School bus 89 (88.12%) 58 (65.17%) 28 (31.46%) 3 (3.37%)
School management 82 (81.19%) 79 (96.34%) 2 (2.44%) 1 (1.22%)
Senior centre 68 (67.33%) 38 (55.88%) 3 (4.41%) 27 (39.71%)
Sewage treatment 85 (84.16%) 42 (49.41%) 16 (18.82%) 27 (31.76%)
Solid waste collection 92 (91.09%) 45 (48.91%) 22 (23.91%) 25 (27.17%)
Solid waste treatment 90 (89.11%) 10 (11.11%) 19 (21.11%) 61 (67.78%)
Stadiums and arenas 62 (61.39%) 52 (83.87%) 4 (6.45%) 6 (9.68%)
Street cleaning 79 (78.22%) 69 (87.34%) 6 (7.59%) 4 (5.06%)
Theatres 55 (54.46%) 53 (96.36%) 1 (1.82%) 1 (1.82%)
Tourism promotion 92 (91.09%) 85 (92.39%) 1 (1.09%) 6 (6.52%)
Traﬃc control and
planning
82 (81.19%) 80 (97.56%) 1 (1.22%) 1 (1.22%)
Urban re-qualiﬁcation 73 (72.28%) 70 (95.89%) 0 (0.00%) 3 (4.11%)
Veterinary services 86 (85.15%) 79 (91.86%) 5 (5.81%) 2 (2.33%)
Water distribution 95 (94.06%) 68 (71.58%) 12 (12.63%) 15 (15.79%)
Youth development 46 (45.54%) 36 (78.26%) 3 (6.52%) 7 (15.22%)
Total Provision
(N¼ 101)
2843 2209 (77.70%) 319 (11.22%) 315 (11.08%)
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Table 5 displays multinomial logit estimates for the choice of external
provision by local decision-makers as an alternative to hierarchical, in-house
solutions for the production of public goods and services. The assumption is
that local oﬃcials prefer hierarchical solutions as a default, but the transaction
costs factors inﬂuence the decision to externalise. Three speciﬁcations are
included. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is the full model including service character-
istics, political environment, and control variables. The second speciﬁcation
incorporates service characteristics as the only set of independent variables and
the third includes all economic and political transaction costs variables. These
speciﬁcations are included as a check for consistency in the behaviour of the
coeﬃcients and standard errors of the estimates.
5. Findings
The overall results conﬁrm the theoretical expectations that transaction
costs play a crucial role in the decision to externalise the production of local
public services. The stronger result concerns service characteristics. Highly
speciﬁc assets are externalised primarily using network/partnership mechan-
isms supporting the argument that there is less potential for opportunistic
behaviour when contracting with other governments and nonproﬁt
organisations (Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock 2008). The evidence indicates
that markets are the least preferred mechanism to produce highly speciﬁc
assets, which also concurs with prior ﬁndings (Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha
2009; Nelson 1997).
Regarding service measurability, the results are even more unequivocal in
terms of the theoretical prediction of transaction costs analysis. For
complex services there is a clear preference for in-house production when
market externalisation is the alternative. The choice between hierarchical
and network mechanisms is unclear as we do not ﬁnd evidence that one is
favoured over the other. In all, Portuguese local oﬃcials seem to prefer a
more conservative approach in the production of complex services. The
local bureaucracy or other arrangement under direct supervision of local
oﬃcials is regarded as the best way to control service delivery when
contracts are hard to write and enforce.
The ﬁndings concerning political transaction costs suggest that stability is
associated with direct service provision through in-house bureaucracies,
whereas political or administrative turmoil leads local oﬃcials to search for
externalisation options. This is inconsistent with the idea that political
transaction costs hinder externalisation, but supports the argument that
local oﬃcials prefer external alternatives in the face of internal conﬂict as a
circumvention strategy to avoid service disruptions or to shift blame to
external providers (Clingermayer & Feiock 1997; Feiock, Clingermayer, &
Dasse 2003; Hood 2007; Tavares & Camo˜es 2010).
The results concerning the impact of the ﬁnancial status of the
municipality upon externalisation are worth analysing. The strongest point
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that can be made is that as the level of ﬁnancial dependency increases, the
probability of adopting market solutions decreases compared to hierarchical
mechanisms. Pallesen (2004) explains this situation using the expression ‘‘the
politics of good times’’. The author states that a good ﬁnancial condition
leads to the adoption of externalisation because there is less friction caused
by public unions at the local level. In Portugal, local governments that are
highly dependent from central government transfers seem to display risk-
averse strategies consistent with conservative preferences over service
production alternatives. Under conditions of ﬁnancial dependency and
budgetary constraints the margin of error is extremely small, and it does not
allow local oﬃcials to engage in innovative and more uncertain options such
as externalisation. These ﬁndings are in line with the idea that oﬃcials resist
experimenting with innovative mechanisms of governance and are also less
enthusiastic regarding the adoption of New Public Management reforms
(Rodrigues & Arau´jo 2006).
Concerning community characteristics, we anticipated that higher levels
of socioeconomic and demographic changes could promote the use of both
market and network mechanisms. Table 5 conﬁrms this expectation. The
level of social development, per capita personal income, and the proportion
of urban land are positively associated with the use of market mechanisms.
The same conclusion is valid for the relationship between the percentage of
urban land use and network mechanisms. Population density is the single
ﬁnding that contradicts our prior expectations. One possible explanation for
this counterintuitive result is that local oﬃcials in highly dense jurisdictions
are able to secure scale economies by keeping service production in-house.
Table 6 displays the relative risk ratios for the independent variables and
the percentage change in predicted probabilities. The odds ratios or relative-
risk ratios (RRR) represent the impact of each variable in the choice of
external governance mechanisms compared to the base outcome (hierarchy).
The percentage change in predicted probabilities is calculated by varying
each independent variable from its minimum to its maximum observed value
in the sample while setting the remaining independent variables at their
mean values. The percentages indicate the increase or decrease in probability
of external production compared to hierarchical/direct provision.
The analysis of service characteristics conﬁrms that economic transaction
costs play an important role in the choice of governance mechanisms. As
expected, more complex services are less likely to be contracted with private
vendors. An increase in one unit in the diﬃculty of measurement scale
reduces the probability of using market mechanisms as an alternative to
hierarchy by 25%. On the other hand, higher levels of asset speciﬁcity
promote the use of network mechanisms. Substantively, a one unit change in
the asset speciﬁcity scale increases the likelihood of partnership/network
production by 55%. This eﬀect is extremely strong, since the variation in
predicted probabilities is close to 400%, increasing from 3.6% when asset
speciﬁcity is at its minimum to 18.05% at the maximum value.
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Analysing political and administrative stability, we verify that in both
cases, higher levels of stability promote the use of hierarchic mechanisms.
While political stability is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of
service production using network arrangements, administrative stability is
primarily linked to less reliance on private sector ﬁrms. Both eﬀects have
similar magnitudes, indicating that externalisation is preferred in jurisdic-
tions dealing with internal turmoil.
In spite of the robustness of the result, ﬁnancial dependency has a
negligible impact upon choice. In contrast, the eﬀect of budgetary surplus
upon contracting with networks/partnerships is the most impressive in our
transaction costs analysis. Both ﬁndings support our hypothesis that
externalisation is more common in times of economic prosperity. The
transaction costs associated with external service delivery, particularly the
loss of political control over service production represent a lesser risk when
budgetary surplus and ﬁnancial independency are the norm.
6. Conclusions and implications
This work emphasises both the economic transaction costs associated with
service characteristics and the political transaction costs ensuing from the
Table 6. Relative risk ratio values and marginal eﬀects
Hierarchy versus
Market Production
Hierarchy versus
Partnerships/Networks
RRR
Percentage change
in predicted
probabilities
from minimum to
maximum values RRR
Percentage change
in predicted
probabilities
from minimum to
maximum values
Asset speciﬁcity .884 1.55*** 394.52%
Service complexity .746*** 764.77% .956
Political stability .826 .639*** 752.21%
Administrative stability .774* 737.38% 1.06
Financial dependency .038*** 70.91% .455
Net debt 1.00 1.00** 811.15%
Social Development
Index
6.26eþ11*** 1110.31% 0.064
Income per capita 1.002** 421.39% 0.999
Population growth rate 0.998 1.030* 151.72%
Area 1.000 1.001* 69.59%
Population density 0.999** 794.43% 0.999** 798.49%
Proportion of
urban land
17.903** 227.02% 28.648*** 325.57%
The predicted probabilities of each production alternative: hierarchy (80.3%), market (9.83%)
and networks/partnerships (9.87%). The percentage change in predicted probabilities is
calculated by varying each independent variable from its minimum to its maximum observed
value and setting the remaining independent variables at their means. The percentages indicate
the increase or decrease in probability of external production compared to hierarchical/direct
provision. *p5 .10; **p5 .05; ***p5 .01; two-tailed tests.
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political arena where the outsourcing decision occurs. The analysis of
Portuguese local service delivery conﬁrms prior ﬁndings that service
characteristics inﬂuence the decision concerning governance mechanisms
(Brown and Potoski 2003; Levin and Tadelis 2007; Carr, LeRoux, and
Shrestha 2009). The externalisation of services involving highly speciﬁc
assets favours contractual options involving fewer risks of opportunistic
behavior, namely the use of partnerships with not-for-proﬁt organisations
or with other governments. Highly complex and hard-to-measure activities
are more amenable for delivery through hierarchical mechanisms to avoid
contractual agreements that are diﬃcult to design and monitor. These
results are aligned with the theoretical predictions of transaction costs
analysis (Williamson 1985; 1996) and supported by other recent empirical
research (Carr, LeRoux, & Shrestha 2009; Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock;
see Bel & Fageda (2007) for a meta-analysis).
The ﬁndings concerning political transaction costs represent a key
contribution to the literature. Higher levels of political and administrative
instability point to the adoption of market mechanisms and network
partnerships rather than hierarchic mechanisms. These results can be under-
stood in light of recent empirical work (Clingermayer & Feiock 1997; Feiock,
Clingermayer, Shrestha, & Dasse 2007; Tavares & Camo˜es 2010). Political
instability leads to the externalisation of services to shift responsibility for the
provision to external agents. Once service provision is delegated to external
actors, local oﬃcials can avoid blame for service disruptions.
Public provision of municipal services can also be regarded as a
delegation decision to help shed some light on these ﬁndings. If the
municipality produces the service directly, the delegation of authority is
hierarchical and the costs incurred by elected oﬃcials are associated with
internal monitoring of subordinate behavior. When the service is produced
by contract with other agents, the delegation of authority is external, and
agency costs are involved in monitoring activities.
Framing contracting out as a delegation decision is not entirely new in the
literature. Andrew Whitford (2010) suggests that the delegation to sub-
national units in a federalist system can be cast as a theory of franchising,
where the delegation of power involves both constraints to franchisee
behaviour and limitations to cross-franchise negative externalities. Likewise,
the externalisation of services entails franchise-like properties since it secures
eﬃciency gains from market competition and coordination beneﬁts from
hierarchical authority.
Hence, local government oﬃcials regard the delegation decision as a
trade-oﬀ between diﬀerent types of transaction costs. Externalisation is
favoured when the ineﬃciencies resulting from agency costs and loss of
political control to the external provider are surmounted by the presence of
signiﬁcant political transaction costs associated with in-house production.
Contracting becomes the logical response to circumvent not only
political and/or administrative turmoil, but also to address environmental
634 M. Rodrigues et al.
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turbulence. Highly dynamic and complex political environments lead to the
adoption of market mechanisms and networks replacing traditional
production using in-house bureaucracies. Externalisation alternatives
appear more frequently in more urban settings experiencing economic
prosperity and signiﬁcant population growth because these solutions are
better at addressing preference diversity. In contrast, hierarchical solutions
are preferred when political transaction costs are low compared to economic
transaction costs associated with contracting decisions.
In sum, the results indicate that both service characteristics and political
contexts are determinants of externalisation decisions, underlining the
resistance of Portuguese local governments to implement New Public
Management reforms as a fashion. Whenever New Public Management
governance mechanisms are adopted, it has been because they are regarded
as appropriate management tools to provide speciﬁc services, not simply to
mimic practices in other jurisdictions. Future work should provide more
detail concerning the choice of governance mechanisms in speciﬁc service
areas such as public works, economic development, and social services.
One important limitation of our study is associated with capturing the
actual decision-making process followed by local government oﬃcials. In
fact, oﬃcials have ﬁrst to decide whether or not to provide a service to their
constituents and only after a positive answer to this question will they
engage in studying alternative production modes. Although this thought
process is frequently recognised in theory, research designs have system-
atically failed to address this fact. This would require a selection model
where the ﬁrst equation estimates the determinants of the decision to
provide the service and the second equation employs a nominal dependent
variable to reﬂect the production decision. Currently, standard statistical
software packages do not allow the sequential treatment of provision and
production decisions, but it is important to recognise this limitation in the
research design in order to correct it in future work.
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